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Abstract
Goal-Oriented Requirement Engineering is a modeling technique that represents software
system requirements using goals as goal models. In a competitive environment, these
requirements may have opposing objectives. Therefore, there is a requirement for a goal
reasoning method, which offers an alternative design option that achieves the opposing
objectives of inter-dependent actors. In this paper, a multi-objective zero-sum game theorybased approach is applied for choosing an optimum strategy for dependent actors in the i* goal
model. By integrating Java with IBM CPLEX optimisation tool, a simulation model based on
the proposed method was developed. A successful evaluation was performed on case studies
from the existing literature. Results indicate that the developed simulation model helps users to
choose an optimal design option feasible in real-time competitive environments.
Keywords: Goal models, Requirements engineering, Game theory.

1.

Introduction

Any software system’s success depends upon the degree to which its requirements are met.
During the last two decades, Requirements Engineering (RE) has progressively been developed
as a critical area of the software development lifecycle [23]. The elicitation process (one of the
most important phases of RE), discovers the stakeholders and identifies the goals/tasks of the
system which in turn indicate the objectives that need to be met by the system. In requirement
analysis phase, the requirements analyst examines information received from stakeholders to
identify their goals from the collected requirements. Stakeholders have hardgoals which
indicate the functions the system has to perform. The non-functional goals of the system are
represented as softgoals which relate to the qualities desired for the system (accuracy,
reliability, performance, etc.). Furthermore, the requirements analyst examines high-level
alternative system design options and decides which system design to implement [10].
Goal-Oriented Requirement Engineering (GORE) is a method that models the software
system's requirements using goals by eliciting, elaborating, structuring, specifying, analysing,
negotiating, documenting and modifying requirements [23]. In GORE, goals play a critical role
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in understanding the domain and determining the stakeholders’ intentions [22]. Goals are
elaborated at different levels of abstraction, from strategic concerns to technical matters.
Hence, it is a significant, well-thought-out artefact during the early phases of RE [5], [ 8]. This
use of goals is modeled on a multi-view model or goal model that illustrates the way in which
goals, actors, states, objects, tasks, and their domain properties are inter-related for the given
system [18].
Ever since the mid-nineties, goal models have been prominent in software engineering
discipline. In software engineering literature, the i* goal model is one of the popular and wellknown goal models, because it helps goal-oriented modelling of socio-technical systems and
organisations. Organisations and socio-technical systems get support in its essential processes
with the use of i* model, as an intentional structure of actors and their dependencies. Reasoning
techniques in the i* goal model enable all types of qualitative analyses [11, 14] or quantitative
analyses [9] or even both [1] to be performed.
In real-world, competitive environments, the goals of many stakeholders of complex systems
are of a conflicting or opposing in nature. Furthermore, each goal (functional requirement) of a
system may have a number of different alternative design options for achieving it. In the i* goal
model, actors have multiple conflicting goals that are dependent on each other. A requirement
analyst has to deal with the challenges of these multiple conflicting goals. Requirement-based
engineering faces the challenge of identifying an optimal alternative design option for a goal
model with conflicting goals. Hence, a novel framework is needed that captures the real issues
behind achieving multi-objective optimisation [7]. The implementation of a realistic decisionmaking process in our approach allows us to go beyond analytical tools, like game-theoretic
concepts. This paper proposes a novel methodology based on game theory for system
exploration which involves alternative design evaluation. Game theory is a powerful interdisciplinary tool for the analysis of competitive situations in multi-agent systems [17]. It can
adequately characterise the interaction between decision-makers and find optimal solutions
under conflicting circumstances, assuming that players are rational and behaving according to
their interests.
In previous research [5], game theory-based goal analysis was proposed for each actor in the i*
goal model without considering the dependency relationships among actors. In a real-world
competitive environment, when making decisions, decision-makers have to consider the interdependent relationships among actors. In this paper, a systematic game theory-based approach
is proposed to facilitate decision-making when there are inter-dependent actors in the i* model
by integrating multiple opposing goals together with their significance. To discover the optimal
alternative options, a two-person zero-sum game approach is applied to the i* goal model. In
the proposed approach, multi-objective functions are determined to decide their significance.
Then, the alternative options for each actor are assessed according to each conflicting softgoal
by applying game theory. In the final phase, an optimal solution is found under the
circumstances of conflicting goals. A case study is used to illustrate the applicability of the
proposed approach. An overview of the existing approaches, techniques and methods related to
GORE and more precisely, i* model, which are closely associated with our approach are
presented in the next section.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the existing approaches, techniques and
methods related to the i* model, which are closely associated with our proposed approach. The
methodology comprising of various steps in our approach and a brief introduction of the
methods used in the study are given in Section 3. The evaluation and simulation of the proposed
work are described in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are drawn at the end of the paper.

2.

Background and Related works

Recent trends in GORE recommend using goals, as a means of discovering the ‘whys’ in the
functionality as opposed to the notion of ‘what’. In this section, an overview of the existing
approaches, techniques and methods related to the i* model, that approximate our approach are
presented. An interactive, iterative, qualitative analysis method for i* goal models was proposed
by Horkoff and Yu [15]. The uncertainty of making decisions when more than one goal has the
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same label is the main limitation of this approach. To analyse alternative design options in the
KAOS model, Heaven et al. [12] proposed quantitative reasoning based multi-objective
optimisation model. However, the main issue with this model is that it does not consider the
non-functional requirements of the system. To deal with the conflicts in NFR decision analysis,
Mairiza et al. [21] developed a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and applied TOPSIS
as an MCDA method for prioritising the alternative options. However, the application of
TOPSIS for the selection of preferred design solution against conflicting NFRs was not
presented. Using the i* model [3], an inter-actor quantitative goal analysis method was
developed for reasoning with non-functional requirements. This method is enhanced by
applying a multi-objective optimisation method to find feasible values of softgoals for an
alternative selection in the goal analysis process [6], [7]. This furthermore helps in preventing
the stakeholders’ from imposing his/her subjective preference of values that are being used for
the goal based reasoning. However, all these proposals for goal analysis are based on either
quantitative or qualitative values used when choosing an alternative design option based on the
maximum satisfaction label of non-functional requirements. However, an ambiguity arises
when two or more non-functional requirements receive the same type of label during decisionmaking [15]. This limitation of the qualitative approach to the i* framework that causes
ambiguity in decision making was overcome by Chitra et al. [6], [7]. Chitra et al. developed
fuzzy-based optimal quantitative methods for goal analysis in the i* model. However, the
existing literature does not include goals with opposing objective functions in reasoning goal
models. In [5], game theory-based goal analysis was proposed but without considering the
dependency relationships among the actors. In a real-world competitive environment, when
making decisions, decision-makers have to consider the inter-dependent relationships among
actors. Overall, using the i* model, previous research efforts have not been able to develop a
systematic game theory-based reasoning approach by reciprocally balancing multiple opposing
objectives with their significance. In the next section, the proposed methodology of reasoning
opposing non-functional requirements in the i* goal model is presented.

3.

Game Theoretic Approach for Reasoning Opposing Non-functional
Requirements

This study aims to provide a more precise decision-making process in real-time competitive
environments by integrating multiple opposing objectives with their significance. For the
calculation convenience and easy presentation, a two-person zero-sum game [2] is applied in
this paper. In the proposed approach, multi-objective functions are determined to decide their
significance. To obtain an optimal strategy for player's having opposing objectives, a
methodology has been proposed in this paper. The proposed methodology is presented in the
following sub-sections.
3.1.

Generation of Multi-Objective Functions

In this section, formalisation approach to the opposing non-functional requirements with
respect to softgoals, goals, tasks and resource elements based on the Strategic Rationale (SR)
model of i* framework is explained. A directed graph, G (N, R) is represented for SR model in
such a way that N indicates softgoals, goals, tasks and resources which represents a collection
of nodes and R indicates the links (means-end, task decomposition, dependency and
contribution links) which shows a collection of edges [20]. The task of a decision maker is to
choose an ideal alternative option from the given choices.
Given an i* goal model, we aim to choose an optimal design based on its contribution on the
softgoals. Impacts are represented as Make, Help, Hurt, Break, Some-, Some+. They are
symbolized as fuzzy triangular numbers that indicate the extent to which an alternative option
fulfils the leaf softgoal [4], [8], [24]. The impacts of the softgoal preferences are backward
propagated to the uppermost softgoals in order to evaluate the scores of the same and to achieve
the level of satisfaction. Furthermore, a weight 𝜔𝜔 is assigned to each leaf softgoals based on
their relative significance in achieving the goal.
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Initially, based on the inter-actor dependency relationship among actors, each top softgoal’s
scores are evaluated. For details on how to generate scores, readers are directed to [3, 4].

Fig. 1. Directed graph of i* model

Assume there are t hierarchy levels in the directed graph, G (N, R) (Figure 1). Let the 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ leaf
softgoal’s weight be 𝜔𝜔𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the impact of 𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡ℎ alternative of 𝑘𝑘 𝑡𝑡ℎ actor on 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ leaf softgoal be
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Consider there are m softgoals, 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 dependencies and 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 children for the 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ softgoal at
level 1. Then, at 𝑡𝑡 > 1, the score of any softgoal is calculated by multiplying its impact with
each child’s score. Thus, a dependency relationship can be generalised in Equation 1 for any
softgoal at level 𝑡𝑡 > 1.
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Consequently, the objective functions of top softgoals are generated with the assumption that
only softgoal inter-dependency relationships are considered in this proposed approach. For an
actor having n alternative options, there will be n different objective functions for each top
softgoal.
The objective functions under nth alternative for each opposing nature (maximisation and
minimisation) are given as,
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛) = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �
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𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛) = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �
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(2)

In this paper, the two-person zero-sum game theory approach is applied to choose an ideal
strategy for inter-dependent actors. Analogous to game theory, in this proposed approach, game
players are considered as the top softgoals with conflicting objective functions of the system
and game strategy is treated as the alternative design options of inter-dependent actors in the i*
goal model. Initially, the application of game theory from the actors' perspective having
opposing objective functions is investigated with the assumption that each actor in the goal
model has the same set of alternative options for achieving his/her opposing objectives.
3.2.

Evaluation of the Optimal Solutions of Multi-Objective Optimization Functions

Consider an i* goal model in which each actor is considered to have two opposing soft goals
(SG 1 and SG 2 ) and two alternative design options (A 1 and A 2 ). Optimising the objective
functions for soft goals individually generates two ideal solutions using Algorithm. 1. The IBM
ILOG CPLEX optimisation tool is used for evaluating the optimisation [19].
Let the ideal solutions for the objective functions for softgoals of an actor using two alternative
design options, based on Equation 2, is expressed as
�𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 𝐴𝐴1 , 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 𝐴𝐴2 , 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 𝐴𝐴1 , 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 𝐴𝐴2 �

(3)

Likewise, for all the actors in the given goal model, the optimal multi-objective function values
are generated.
Algorithm 1: Main Module- Optimal Selection
Input: A collection of directed graphs 𝑆𝑆 = {𝑆𝑆1 , 𝑆𝑆2 , … , 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 } where G ⊆ S
having same n number of tasks T, where 𝐺𝐺 = {𝐺𝐺1 , 𝐺𝐺2 , … , 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘 } and each 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
represents {𝑇𝑇, 𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇} which indicates a set of task, a set of
Leaf softgoals, a set of in-between softgoals, a set of top
softgoals respectively with each top softgoal associated with
opposing variables such as Max or Min.
𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟 Gi ∈ G 𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝
𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟 task t ∈ T 𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝
𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟 top softgoals t s ∈ TS 𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝
𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 t s is Min 𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭
Generate minimisation objective function;
𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞
𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢 t s is Max 𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭
Generate maximisation objective function;
𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞
break;
𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞
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𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞

𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞
Let FMax ← Max�fmax1 , fmax2 , … … , fmaxn �;
Let FMin ← Min�fmin1 , fmin2 , … … , fminn �;
𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟 fmaxi ∈ FMax 𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝
Let xmaxi ← optimal�fmaxi , Max�; //finding optimal solutions for
maximum objective functions
𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞
𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟𝐟 fmini ∈ FMin 𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝
Let xmini ← optimal�fmini , Min�; //finding optimal solutions for
minimum objective functions
𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞𝐞
Generate pay-off matrix, 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 , for maximum objective
function values, by integrating x max 's of all Gi ∈ G
Generate pay-off matrix, 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 , for minimum objective function
values, by integrating x min 's of all Gi ∈ G
Generate decision pay-off matrix P by merging pay-off matrices
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
Generate primal linear equation using MaxMin strategy
Generate the optimal solution by solving the primal linear
equation
Sub Module - Solving Multi-objective functions to obtain the optimal function value
Define the objective functions and their constraints based on
C;
𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕
Define maximisation objective function;
𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆
𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕
Define minimisation objective function;
𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆
𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓 (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠( ) → 𝑾𝑾);
𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆
3.3.

Objective Integrated
Transformation

Game

Theoretic

Approach

for

Pay-Off

Matrix

In this section, the objective function values of top softgoals are integrated for all actors in the
goal model that are of the same nature (for example: maximise) under each alternative to
generate the pay-off matrix (for each nature). To understand the formation of the pay-off matrix
according to the objective function values, let us assume that there are two actors in the same
goal model with an inter-actor dependency relationship from X to Y. Also, assume that both
actors have the same alternative options (A 1 and A 2 ) for reaching their opposing top softgoals
(TS 1 (Maximise) and TS 2 (Minimise)). The optimal function values for each actor are
represented in Table 1 as a ready reference.
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Table 1. Objective functions values
Optimal Function Values
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝐴𝐴1
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝐴𝐴2
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2𝐴𝐴1
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2𝐴𝐴2

X
𝑥𝑥 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝐴𝐴1
𝑥𝑥 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝐴𝐴2
𝑥𝑥 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2𝐴𝐴1
𝑥𝑥 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2𝐴𝐴2

Y
𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝐴𝐴1
𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1𝐴𝐴2
𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2𝐴𝐴1
𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2𝐴𝐴2

Based on the optimal function values shown in Table 1, the pay-off matrices, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
are generated for each top softgoal by taking the summation of the objective function values
that are of the same nature for all actors based on each alternative. Now the pay-off matrix
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 for the top softgoal 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 which has to be maximised for two actors X and Y under n
alternatives is generalised as shown below
𝐴𝐴2
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴2
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴2
……
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴2

𝐴𝐴1
𝑃𝑃
𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴1
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝐴𝐴2 � 𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴1
……
⋮
𝑃𝑃
𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴1

… … 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛
… … 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛
… … 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛
�
…… ……
… … 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛

where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 , for i, j =1 to n

(4)

If there are s number of actors in an i* goal model, in such a way that 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 actors have the
same set of n number of alternatives, then each element in the final pay-off matrix of top
softgoal that has to be maximised is obtained as:
∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗=1 𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 , where 𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑙𝑙 = 𝑛𝑛 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑙𝑙 = 𝑛𝑛

(5)
where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote an element of the pay-off matrix of every combination of 𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡ℎ actor of
k resulting from choosing the 𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑡ℎ and 𝑟𝑟 𝑡𝑡ℎ alternative of n. Similarly, the pay-off matrix
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 for the top softgoal 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 which has to be minimised for two actors X and Y under n
number of alternatives can be generalised.
3.4.

Decision Pay-Off Matrix Formation

The overall objective of opposing goals simultaneously can be achieved by merging the payoff matrices that are obtained separately for each player. This process of integrating objectives
with their importance based on alternatives is known as the unification process. An optimal
strategy is obtained by analysing the unified pay-off matrices. Now, using 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ,
the decision pay-off matrix P is generated as shown below:
𝐴𝐴1
𝐴𝐴1 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴1
𝑍𝑍
𝑃𝑃 = 𝐴𝐴2 � 𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴1
……
⋮
𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴1

𝐴𝐴2

𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴2
𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴2
……
𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴2

… … 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛
… … 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛
… … 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴2 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛
�
…… ……
… … 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛

where 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 + 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴1 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 , for i, j =1 to n

(6)
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3.5.

OPTIMAL REASONING OF OPPOSING NON_FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS...

Linear Programming Model to Obtain Optimal Strategy and Decision Making

In the last phase, the optimal strategy is obtained by analysing the unified decision pay-off
matrix by applying linear programming method [13] to the decision pay-off matrix, shown in
Equation 6.
In the case of top softgoal that has to be maximised, (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ), follows the Max-Min strategy,
the formulation of which is given below as ready reference:
Let the value of the game is v; the strategies are A 1 , A 2 ... A n ; the upper value of the game is 𝑣𝑣;
the lower value of the game is 𝑣𝑣 and the range of the values of the game is = 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑣𝑣 .
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑣𝑣,

Subject to the linear constraints
−𝑢𝑢 × 𝑣𝑣 + ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=𝑗𝑗=1 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 × 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑣 ,

∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 =1; ∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 =1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑛𝑛

(7)

From Equation 7 all the values are in linear form, and the solution to the game can be found by
using a linear programming method. Similarly, player 2 i.e., top softgoal (TS Min ), follows the
Min-Max strategy. The linear formulation, TS Min is the dual of TS Max, . So the solution to the
game is found by solving either the formulation of TS Max or TS Min . Thus, the optimal proportion
values of the strategies are evaluated by solving either formulation and the strategy with high
proportion value is selected.

4. Simulation and Evaluation
The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed approach (of the i*goal model) were tested by
performing experiments on different case studies from the literature namely Telemedicine
system [26], Meeting Scheduler system [4]. The result of the Telemedicine case study is
presented in this paper.

Fig. 2 Simplified SR model for the Telemedicine system (with dependency)

The adapted telemedicine system is shown in Figure 2 with actors, Patient and Health Care
Provider. For more details about the telemedicine system, readers are directed to [26]. The
objective of this system is to choose an optimal alternative option regarding its impact on each
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of the softgoals. The defuzzified values, as shown in Table 2, are used to evaluate the objective
functions of each top softgoal.
Table 2. Defuzzified values for impacts
Impact
Make
Help
Some+
SomeHurt
Break

Defuzzified value
0.8
0.64
0.48
0.32
0.16
0

The objective function values for both actors, under both alternatives, are given in Table 3 using
Equation 2 as a ready reference.
Table 3. Optimal values for the Telemedicine system
Optimal values
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1Patient Centered Care
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1Provider Centered Care
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2Patient Centered Care
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2Provider Centered Care

Patient
51.2
51.2
5.24
10.24

Healthcare Provider
30.72
40.96
12.8
51.2

An optimal strategy is obtained using a linear programming model on Equation 7, and the result
is shown in Table 4. The results indicate that by choosing the Provider Centered Care strategy,
the system achieves the opposing top softgoals of inter-dependent actors in the i* goal model
reciprocally.
For evaluating the optimisation model using game theory, a tool was implemented as shown in
Figure 3 using Java Eclipse environment integrated with the IBM ILOG CPLEX optimisation
tool.
Table 4. Optimal linear formulation for the Telemedicine system
Alternatives
Patient Centered Care
Provider Centered Care

Optimal solution
-9.73
10.73
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Fig. 3. Tool result for the Telemedicine system (with dependency)

5.

Conclusion

A game theory-based goal analysis for the i* goal model has been proposed in this paper. The
proposed model is tested and then evaluated based on the optimal alternative selection by
balancing the opposing objectives of dependent actors in the i* goal model. The proposed
approach involves a multi-objective optimisation process in a two-person zero-sum game
situation. Further research topics include arriving at optimal solutions for conflicting goals
among inter-dependent actors. Also, performing sensitivity analysis, for facilitating valuable
input data to help stakeholders in the decision-analysis process.
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